The institutional arrangeillents in the coffee market constitute circumstantial evidence of an intent by large producers to exert market power. The difficulties of negotiating these agreements and the allegations that many exporting countries fail to cor~lply fully with thein suggest that producers do not behave as a perfect cclilcl. Thus, the hypothesis that the market structure lies between monopoly and corilpetition is plausible. The complexity and inconstancy of coffee marketing institutions and paucity of data make it unreasonable to attempt to estimate the explicit game that producers play. Instead, we estimate a fairly general set of relations that include, as special cases, the equilibrium conditions associated with perfectly competitive, collusive, and Nsh-Coumot behavior. Thus, we are able to determine whether the observed outcome is consistent with any of these equilibria.
The standard static assurl~ption is inappropriate where there are large adjustment costs in training, storage, or in capital accumulation. There are two reasons to use a dynamic rnodel for coffee. First, changes in production involve nonlinear costs. A lag of 2 to 5 years exists between planting and first harvest; a tree produces its maxirllurn output between 5 to I0 years of age and bears for up to 30 years. This pattern suggests that average adjustment costs increase with the size of adjustment. Second, Brazil and Colombia irtaintain large stockpiles. In standard inventory models (e. g., Blinder), the costs of invento~y adjustment are assumed to be reasonably approximated by a quadratic function. Costs of adjusting cxports, therefore, stem frorn costly adjustment of production or inventories.'
The hlodel
Our dynamic modcl is llcxihle enough to :illow Sor thc possibility that Brazil (Firm 1) and Coloinbia (Finn 2) act likc pricc trikcrs, colludc, or cxpoil oligopolistic lcvcls hctwcen thosc two extremes. For siniplicity, other countries' exports are ignored in this section hut zue accounted for in the estimates. In period t, firlns face the invcrse residual linear dcrnand curve (1)
where p, is the real price in period t, Q, is the combined export of Brazil (yit) and Colomhia (y2,), a(t) includes effects of exogenous variables such as exports of other countries, and b is a positive coefficient.
Each Finn i has constant marginal costs 0, with respect to contemporaneous exports qi, and a quadratic adjustment cost eiqi, + where u. -q. -q-is the change in a l,t It 1.t-i firm's export level frorn period t-1 to period 1. In contrast, a static model sets y, and 6 equal to zero.
Static Model
In most e~npirical static models of oligopoly, aggregate or firrn level data are used to esti~nate a parameter, which we call v, that reflects the rnarkup of price over rnarginal cost. Given demand equation ( I ) for a homogcncous product, Firm i's effective marginal revenue curve (the marginal revenue given thc degree of inarket powcr actually exercised) is MRi(v) = p + (1
If all firms have a cornrnon i. arlti conntton mal.gina1 cost, MC = MC, = 0, we call rewrite the cquilibriurn equations for each fir~n, MRi(i,) = ,MC r B, as:
(2) Some authors interpret v as a finn's constant conjectural variation about its rival: v n dqjldqi. We prefer the neutral interpretation that v is a measure of market power -the gap between marginal cost and price -so that we do not need to make the behavior assumptions of conjectural variations models. Moreover, the conjectural variation interpretation cannot be used in the feedback dynamic model we now describe.
The Linear-Qr~ndr~tic Dyrrornic Morirl
The game-theoretic literature ahounds with very general dynamic models of oligopoly that do not lend themselves to estimation. To ttinke the estimation problem tractable, we restrict our model to a specific fiunily of equilibria indexed by a parameter v as in the static model. We estimate the farnily of equilihria under the assutnption that firms use subganie perfect, Markov Karp and Perloff (1991) . In oligopolistic models, such as where iirins play Nash within a period, the two models imply different adjustment paths and steady-state expoit levels. Given sufficient cost information to test overidentifying restrictions, one can empirically diserirninate between the two types of behavior (Karp and Perloff 1989) . Lacking that information, we estimate both models to detem~ine the sensitivity of the measure of market structure to maintained hypotheses regarding behavior. The two assumptions lead to similar rcsults for coffee.
We estimate the Markov niodel using a variant of the linear-quadratic gatne solution (Starr and Colombia rnight in~perfectiy collude. Another possibility is that expoll levels are chosen subject to political pressures (one group wants to maximize export revenues and another wants to increase labor detnand), which causes a deviation fro~rr Nash-Cournot or collusive
Rather than try to model explicitly c~c h of these games, we usc an index v that allows for infcrmediate paths and steady-state expotls. This intlex is the dyntt~nic analog of the pricem;irginal cost wedge used in static riiodels of oligopoly.
In each period ol' the dynatnic model, i-is111 i's revenues Ri equal p,qi,. Given a discount factor 0, Fir111 i's objective is to int~xi~riizc its discounted stream of proiits, where @, -8,)q,, is the contemporaneous profit and the last tenn is the adjustnlent cost. With
Markov strategies, Firm i chooses changes in exports II,, as a function of the current information:
its own and its rival's lagged export.
If we define J, (q,; v) as the piesent discounted value of Firm i's program, given the state Our objective is to obtain a consistent estnnate of the index v of market structure in the subgarne perfect, dynamic rnodel. We also estinlate 6, the quadratic adjustinent parameter. We can allow paranieters y, , 0,, and tr,(t) to be lirni specific and nonstationary to reflect quality differences, transpottation costs, or other firm-specific costs. 
Q, = ~i r i
where g(t) is a coluriin vector and G is a 2 x 2 mairix with elements Gii (i, j = 1, 2): In We estimate the G matrix in ad,justment equation (6) For the estimated dynamical systern to "make sense," it rnust have three properties:
The systein is srcrbie: -1 < GI + G, < 1 and -1 < GI -G, < 1.
The market srrlrcrirre lies between collusion and price taking:
The ctdjnstmmt parameter in each of the rnodcls is positive:
Our classical point estimates of the elernents of G and our estimates of # and Fjk are consistent with these restrictions.
Bayesian Estirnntes
Rather than estimate the unconstrained systenl and hope the point estimates lie in the desired range, we can irnpose the above three sets of restrictions. Although it would he extremely difficult, if not impossible, to inlpose such inequalities using a classical approach or to test thern, Geweke (1986 Geweke ( , 1989 and Chalfant, Gray, and White show how to impose and test inequality restrictions with Bayesian techniques.
Our Bayesian prior is the protiuct of it conventional uninformative distribution and an indicator function that erluals I whcrc the inctjuality constraints arc satislied and 0 elsewhere.
The posterior tiistrihution is calculated using hlonte Carlo numerical integration with inlpoilance sampling. Given a c~uadratic (absolute dii'fercnce) loss function, estimates of the parameters consistent with thc rcstrictiuns are obtained by ciilculnting the mean (mcdiiin) of the coefficient estimates for all replications in which the constraints are satisfied. Indeed, we obtain the full posterior distributions of 1 ) : and vi. are 3 to I), the data indicate there is dynaniic acijust~iient.~
The assu~:iption in this Bayesian approach that the original error ternls are norrnal can be relaxed by using a bootstrapping approach ;IS repoi-ied in tahle 2.' The bootstrap estirnates show slightly higher standard deviations corresponding to the mean \t estirnates (0.43 and 0.44), a lower probability of rejecting due to 1 , : 5 -1 (19 percent), and a higher probability of rejecting due to < 1 (11 percent).
k
Bayesian estimates provide 311 entire posterior distribution of miirket pararnctcr L . Sollie of the information fro111 the iiilpo~Taiicc sar~ipliiig histograins is siimm;irizcd in tahle 3. which shows the prohahilily that tk lies within certain ranges. The prohilhility that 1, ; lies hetween -1 (price taking) and 0 (Nash-Cournot) is greater than 90 pcrcent. Thcrc is a slightly higher probability (nearly 50 percent) that i . ; lies between the classical estirnate and 0 than between -1 and the classical estinlate (over 40 percent). Two-thirds of the distribution lies below i.i. In the feedback model, the postetior odds ratio that the ruarkct stlvcture lies between price taking and Nash-Conrnot rather than between Nash-Cournot and collusive is 12.9.
Results for the bootstrap rriodcl are similar; however, the bootstrap distribution has thicker tails. The bootstrap posterior odds ratio that the market structure is more colnpetitive than NashCournot versus the opposite is 8.3 -less than the odds using the ilnporzance sampling estimates but still very high. Based on either the classical or Bayesian approaches, the Brazil-Colombia exports are close to price taking. The probability that they are at least as noncon~petitive as Nash-Cournot is no greater than 11 percent according to all our estimating approaches.
Simulations
We can simulate adjustment paths and steady states based on the above estimates? The steady states vary in the two cstiiilatcd dynariiic models for two reasons. First, for either model, the lower the estirnated v. the closer its steady-state expon is to price taking. As Adjustrilent paths vary across modi'ls. As figure I (where exports of both countsics aue set to zero in year zero) shows for tile classical cstirnatcs, thc coiiihined expor-ts of the two coilntries in the feedback model reaches a hifhcr stcady-state level than in the open-loop rnodel: hut, in both models, expoi-ts reach their ste:idy sttlte level after only t h r c years.
To illustrate a more realistic :~cljustii~i'nt path, we solvcd the dyna~ilic garlie using esti~ltatcd v and 6 and illasfinal costs ohtniried by ~nottcl calibration (assuming the steady-state exports equal the average expoits in the salriple period). In each period, we added the residuals plus the coefficient (from the estiniated adjustsilent equation) tirnes the Brazilian freeze dusnrnies to the simulated q,. These simulations exclude demand-side shocks and also igno~z the upward trend in the demand curve, which [nay explain why the siiuulations shown in iigure 2 are low toward the end of the period. Even ignoring the dcrnand trend, though, figure 2 shows the model is capable of esnulating reality reasonably well. 9. In the simulations, we choose rllarginal cost parameters for Brazil and Colombia so the steadystate export under the classically estiiliated feedback rnodel equals the average export for the sample period. Because thc constant marginal costs are 11ot identified in our estir~lation procedure, we set the marginal cost of Brazil to rxro 2nd scarchcd fix the marginal cost of Colombia and the residual demand intercept producing the avcragc steady-state outputs for the two countries.
Summary and
Subtracting b times the average output ot the rest of the world's producers from the estimated demand curve intercept approxirnarely equals the resulting residual demand intercept. 
